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In many business transactions, labor-management relations, international conflicts, and welfare-state reforms,bargainers hold strong entitlements that are often generated by claims that are not feasible anymore. These
entitlements seem to shape negotiation behavior considerably. By using the novel setup of a “bargaining with
claims” experiment, we provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligations
through the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining
duration, concessions, and (dis)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a “moral property right” that
is influential independent of negotiators’ legal property rights.
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1. Introduction
In many negotiations, bargainers bring strong entitle-
ments to the bargaining table. These entitlements are
often rooted in historical claims, custom, or the status
quo (see, e.g., Kahneman et al. 1986, Zajac 1995). Enti-
tlements seem to matter in business relations, in wage
arbitration, wage setting, corporate mergers, nuptial
breakups, peace treaties, and many other situations
where people need to bargain.1
However, in many of these negotiations enti-
tlements are inconsistent. The long-lasting Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is a prominent example where
infeasible claims—in this case on pieces of land—
shape entitlements (e.g., Feith 1993). There is also evi-
dence that the welfare state has generated important
entitlements of different groups that under changed
economic conditions may be inconsistent, but deter-
mine attitudes on necessary reforms (e.g., Romer
1 The importance of entitlements extends beyond these examples.
In the context of market transactions, Kahneman et al. (1986) were
among the first to note the relevance of historical transactions for
setting a reference point in what they call the “principle of dual
entitlement, which governs community standards of fairness: Trans-
actors have an entitlement to the terms of the reference transaction,
and firms are entitled to their reference profit” (italics in original).
Kachelmeier et al. (1991) and Franciosi et al. (1995) dwelt on this
idea and examined the consequences of entitlements in multiperiod
posted-bid and posted-offer market experiments with taxation.
1996, Boeri et al. 2001). Inconsistent entitlements that
are often based on infeasible claims also seem to influ-
ence wage negotiations in companies under economic
strain.
To our knowledge there is not yet any systematic
investigation on how infeasible claims actually influ-
ence entitlements and negotiations. In this paper we
take up this issue and provide comprehensive evi-
dence on the influence of infeasible claims on nego-
tiations. We do this by way of controlled laboratory
experiments investigating a bargaining problem with
infeasible claims and the derived entitlements. For the
purposes of our paper, Schlicht (1998, p. 24) provides
a very succinct definition of an entitlement, and its
counterpart, an obligation:
Entitlements are rights, as perceived by the individ-
ual. They are not, however, abstract legal rights. Rather
they denote the subjectively perceived rights that go
along with a motivational disposition to defend them.
Obligations are the counterparts of entitlements. They
refer to claims of others that are subjectively accepted,
and go along with a motivational disposition to respect
these claims (italics added).
To study the role of entitlements in negotiations,
we introduce an experimental two-person “bargain-
ing with infeasible claims” setup. It is inspired by the
class of “bargaining problems with claims” mainly
studied in game theory. A bargaining problem with
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claims is a standard bargaining problem enriched
with a “claims point,” i.e., a claim on a certain share of
the pie that lies outside the feasible bargaining set (see
O’Neill 1982 for the seminal paper on such problems).
Chun and Thomson (1992, p. 20) characterize
the meaning of claims by an example of a labor-
management negotiation:
   labor and management come to the negotiation
table with certain expectations, or with certain claims.
   the claims may represent commitments made to
the agents in earlier negotiations which, because of
changes in the industry that may have adversely
affected the feasible set of the firm, cannot all be hon-
ored any more.
A recent prominent example for the relevance of
entitlements in bargaining in the business arena are
the wage-cut negotiations between United Airlines
and the unions representing its employees in Fall 2002
and Spring 2003. These negotiations were necessary
because of the threat of bankruptcy United Airlines
was facing at this time. They led to (temporary) wage
cuts that were quite different for different groups of
employees. It ranged from 29% for the high-salary
pilots to 9% for the relatively low-paid flight atten-
dants (Corfman and Schmeltzer 2002).
In our experiment, we model the bargaining prob-
lem with claims as follows. Subjects first acquire
claims in a competitive task. With a certain probabil-
ity, these claims are actually paid out to the subjects.
With the remaining probability, the acquired claims
are not feasible anymore and subjects have to negoti-
ate an agreement in a completely symmetric free-form
bargaining over a computer net. In case they fail to
reach an agreement, they earn nothing.
In this research we are interested in the entitlements
people derive from infeasible claims and how these
entitlements influence negotiations. The claims are the
granted shares of the pie, in case the claims are feasi-
ble. By contrast, in line with Schlicht’s definition, we
refer to entitlements as the subjective judgments of bar-
gainers about what their fair share of the remaining
pie is, in case the claims are infeasible. To learn about
the entitlements bargainers derive from the infeasi-
ble claims, negotiators are asked in private what they
think a fair settlement from the vantage point of a
neutral arbitrator is, before they start to bargain.
This research design allows us to study several
important issues. First, we can investigate which enti-
tlements bargainers actually derive from the infeasible
claims. Previous research suggests that entitlements
are likely to be self-servingly biased (e.g., Babcock
and Loewenstein 1997). Second, because entitlements
are subjectively held fairness judgments, which may
be self-servingly biased, it is likely that they cannot
be satisfied without some curtailment by at least one
bargaining party. Our experimental design allows us
to track the impact of entitlements through the whole
negotiation process—from the opening offers, the
concessions, and bargaining duration to the reached
agreements and disagreements.
Our main results are as follows. First, entitlements
as measured by elicited fairness judgments are highly
correlated with the claim earned in the first part of
the experiment. Quite surprisingly—and in contrast
to previous literature—fairness judgments are only
modestly self-servingly biased. Second, we show that
entitlements influence the whole bargaining process:
We find that (i) opening offers are strongly correlated
with the entitlements and obligations; (ii) tensions in
entitlements held by the negotiators tend to prolong
negotiations and are a significant reason for the often-
observed “deadline effect” of last-minute agreements;
(iii) entitlements shape the concessions that are neces-
sary to strike an agreement; and (iv) reached agree-
ments are highly correlated with the entitlements and
obligations.
Our result that the agreements are strongly skewed
away from the equal division is in stark contrast to
previous symmetric free-form bargaining experiments
without claims. There, almost unanimously, the equal
split was implemented (see, e.g., Nydegger and Owen
1975).
Theoretically, the free-form bargaining game with
claims exhibits many possible outcomes. Axiomatic
analyses provide arguments for several solutions,
each giving different outcomes for the same claims
(see Thomson 2003 for an overview). When viewing
(the last few seconds of) the free-form bargaining as a
Nash-demand game, every efficient allocation of the
surplus can be sustained by a noncooperative Nash
equilibrium. Because there are many equilibrium out-
comes, many variables can provide a correlation
device that promotes agreements and influences how
the surplus is shared. Our study is the first to show
that entitlements derived from infeasible claims are an
effective device that strongly and systematically influ-
ences the whole negotiation process. Our findings
suggest that entitlements constitute a moral property
right that exists independently of the legal property
rights.
2. Experimental Setup
The main purpose of our study is to investigate how
entitlements derived from infeasible claims shape
negotiations. Therefore, our experimental design
consists of three ingredients: (i) negotiations in a
“bargaining with claims” experiment, (ii) the imple-
mentation of claims, and (iii) the measurement of
entitlements. A sample copy of the instructions is
available at http://www1.fee.uva.nl/creed/pdffiles/
InstrToMPRBIC.pdf.
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2.1. Features of the Experimental Design
The “Bargaining with Claims” Environment.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were ran-
domly and anonymously paired and introduced to
the bargaining problem. To make the experimental
task cognitively easy and to enhance the perceived
symmetry of bargaining roles, we cast the bargain-
ing as one between two “heads of departments”
in a hypothetical firm that consists of two depart-
ments. Subjects were told that in this firm the total
budget available for both salaries is 2,490 “points.”
In the experiments, 10 points were worth E018.
Hence, the salary budget was worth E1810 (≈$1800).
The instructions said that the firm’s previous policy
always has been to grant the better-performing head
of department a higher share of the total salary bud-
get (1,660 points) than the lower-performing head of
department (830 points). However, there is now the
possibility that—due to exogenous factors beyond the
control of the firm—economic conditions for the firm
become worse and the salary budget will have to be
cut to 2,050 points. The firm states that, should this
case materialize, it will not impose any sharing of
the new salary budget onto the managers. Instead,
the firm asks the heads of departments to bargain
among themselves to reach an agreement of how to
split the new salary budget. If they reach an agree-
ment, it is implemented and each head of depart-
ment will receive the agreed share. The subjects were
also told that they are “fired;” i.e., they will not earn
any money in the experiment except the promised
show-up fee, should they fail to reach an agreement.
In case the salary budget does not shrink, the
bargaining partners are paid according to the pre-
vious wage policy: The manager with the better
performance will receive a salary of 1,660 points,
whereas the manager with the inferior performance
will receive a salary of 830 points. Whether the salary
budget is 2,490 or 2,050 is determined by chance.
Notice that this story—in the case where the salary
budget shrinks—depicts a “bargaining with infeasible
claims” problem. In the case where the smaller salary
budget becomes relevant, the sum of both “claims”
(read “historically implemented sharing of the salary
budget”) lies outside the bargaining set. The disagree-
ment payoff of the bargaining problem is 00.
The Implementation of Claims. In the experi-
ments we explained the “performance measurement”
as follows:
In this experiment performance will be measured with
a general knowledge quiz. The department head who
gives correct answers to a greater number of questions
than the other department head has shown the bet-
ter performance, and has therefore, given the firm’s
previous policy, earned a salary claim of 1,660 points.
The department head with the lower performance pre-
viously received a salary of 830 points.
The “general knowledge quiz” consisted of 16 ques-
tions from a variety of fields, including astronomy,
history, sports, music, politics, etc. We were very
careful to select questions that students with a high
school degree should in principle be able to answer,
and that subjects would recognize as testing their
high school knowledge. The knowledge quiz was a
multiple-choice test with five possible choices and
only one correct answer. All subjects had to answer
the same questions. They had eight minutes to answer
the questions.
After the quiz, we told the subjects which of the two
bargaining partners did better in the knowledge quiz.
We informed them only about the rank of their per-
formance and not about the actual number of correct
answers. Apart from simplicity reasons, we wanted to
hold the claims constant across subjects and between
bargaining pairs.
Recall from the description of our bargaining prob-
lem that a chance move determined whether the
salary budget shrank to 2,050 points or stayed at 2,490
points, where the latter outcome implied that the
claims according to the knowledge quiz were actu-
ally paid out. In the experiment the chance move was
implemented as follows. After subjects were informed
about the rank of their performance, each bargaining
partner in a dyad had to roll a six-sided die. It was
explained that the claims would actually be paid out
if the sum of the numbers of both dice was greater
than or equal to 11. If the sum of the dice numbers
was smaller than 11, the bargaining partners had to
bargain over how to split the new salary budget of
2,050 points.
The reason we implemented this chance procedure
was to make the claims a potential payment in the
experiment. This gave the subjects an incentive to see
the knowledge quiz as an important part of the exper-
iment. On the other hand, our main research interest
is to investigate the impact of perceived entitlements
on bargaining outcomes. Therefore, we set the prob-
ability that bargaining actually had to take place to
11/12.
Measurement of Entitlements. All subjects in the
experiment had to answer the following question
(adapted from Babcock et al. 1995):
According to your opinion, what would—in case of the
bad economic condition for the firm—be a “fair” distri-
bution of the salaries from the vantage point of a non-
involved neutral arbitrator? (Please use exact amounts;
no intervals! The amounts have to sum up to 2050 points!)
(emphasis in original.)
In the remainder we will refer to this question as
the “arbitrator question.” The fairness judgments we
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receive as answers to this arbitrator question inform
us on the perceived entitlements and obligations of
our subjects. In the results part of the paper, we
will link the fairness judgments to the negotiation
behavior.
2.2. Experimental Procedures
Table 1 summarizes the sequence of events. After sub-
jects arrived at the lab, we randomly allocated them
to computer booths, which were located in two dif-
ferent rooms. Each subject’s bargaining partner was
always in the other room. Subjects first read the exper-
imental instructions that introduced them to the bar-
gaining problem and the performance measurement.
After subjects had finished reading the instructions,
they answered the knowledge quiz and rolled the dice
in front of an experimenter to determine whether the
claims would be paid out or whether they would have
to bargain over 2,050 points. In case the dice deter-
mined that the claims would be paid out, we told
the pairs to bargain hypothetically over the sharing of
2,050 points. We ensured the subjects that they would
receive their claims irrespective of the outcome in the
hypothetical bargaining. (Actually, only one pair had
to bargain hypothetically.) We announced the arbitra-
tor question just before the start of the negotiations.
We told the subjects that no other participant of the
experiment would be informed about their answer to
this arbitrator question.
The bargaining was free-form; i.e., there was
no fixed bargaining protocol (see, e.g., Roth and
Murnighan 1982). Bargaining was conducted over a
local area network with the help of the experimen-
tal software “Rabbit” (Brandel 1998). The negotiators
were allowed to make any (nonnegative) proposal as
long as the sum of shares was smaller than or equal
to 2,050 points. Subjects also had the opportunity to
send messages along with a proposal (as long as these
messages did not contain threats or reveal the iden-
tity of the sender, which was checked by an experi-
menter). Mere messages without a proposal were not
possible. The negotiators had 15 minutes to reach an
Table 1 Sequence of Events
1. Reading of instructions
2. Quiz determines claims and subjects are
informed about them(
1660 points for “winner”
830 points for “loser”
)
3. Nature determines whether claims are paid
out or if bargaining over 2,050 points
takes place
4. Arbitrator question
5. Free-form bargaining over 2,050 points
(max. 900 sec.)
6. Postexperimental questionnaire
# of pairs 45
agreement. In case of an impasse, subjects earned
nothing except their show-up fee. Hence, the “threat
point” in this experiment was 00. Random pairing,
anonymity, duration, and disagreement payoffs were
common knowledge.
One reason for choosing free-form bargaining with
a symmetric threat point was that it made the bargain-
ing partners strategically equal. By avoiding obvious
“first (or last) mover advantages” as well as any other
exogenously induced strategic differences, the poten-
tial that strategic effects confound possible entitle-
ment effects was minimized.2 In addition, compared
to a strict bargaining protocol, free-form bargaining
gives more freedom to the negotiators, e.g., in the tim-
ing and the number of offers. This makes it easier to
observe potential entitlement-specific behavioral pat-
terns during the bargaining process.
After the bargaining, we administered a ques-
tionnaire that asked the subjects a couple of ques-
tions about their socioeconomic characteristics, their
motives in the experiment, and their attitudes
towards the quiz and the claims.
We conducted the experiments in the computer-
ized lab of the Institute for Advanced Studies in
Vienna. Ninety subjects participated in eight experi-
mental sessions. Our subjects were first-year under-
graduate students of law, business administration,
and computer science. Each session lasted approxi-
mately 75 minutes. The average earnings (including a
show-up fee of E510) per subject was approximately
E1250 (≈$1230).
3. Results
We will first set the stage by presenting the results
of the fairness judgments according to the arbitrator
question. Then we will move on to the bargaining
process (opening offers, bargaining duration, and con-
cessions) and the agreements and disagreements as a
function of the entitlements.
For convenience, we will in the remainder of the
paper refer to the subject with the claim of 1,660 (830)
as the “winner” (“loser”) of the performance quiz.
Moreover, we will adopt the convention of expressing
all allocations in “winner shares,” i.e., the share of
the total pie of 2,050 that goes to the “winner” of the
quiz, regardless of whether this proposed allocation
was made by a winner or a loser.
3.1. The Entitlements
There are at least three perspectives that might shape
entitlements. First, normative bargaining theory sug-
gests many solutions for our bargaining problem with
claims (see Thomson 2003). For instance, the solution
2 For a study that looks at a situation where one party is in a
stronger position than the other, see, e.g., Zwick and Chen (1999).
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concept “constrained equal award” proposes that the
loser receives her whole claim and the winner has
to bear the whole reduction of the pie. Another pro-
posed solution is the “constrained equal loss,” where
the loser bears a disproportionately large share of
the reduction of the pie. According to the “propor-
tional rule,” which is, for instance, predicted by the
“accountability principle” (Konow 2000), the winner
is entitled to a share of 2/3. According to the Talmud
solution, the winner would be entitled to 60.7% and
the loser to 39.3%.3 If negotiators perceive the claims
as irrelevant, the “equal split” would result.4
Second, entitlements can also be role specific. Win-
ners and losers may arrive at different fairness judg-
ments; i.e., their perceptions are self-servingly biased.
For example, it is well known from psychological
research that people tend to attribute their success to
their skill, but believe that failures are largely due to
bad luck (see Zuckerman 1979). Likewise, a large lit-
erature indicates that people tend to view as fair what
benefits them.5
Third, from research in cognitive psychology it is
well known that people can entertain multiple rep-
resentations of the same fact. One representation of
entitlements could be that they refer to the historical
claims, expressed in nominal terms. This is a possibil-
ity because many people suffer from money illusion
also in the context of justice evaluations (Kahneman
et al. 1986, Shafir et al. 1997). Another representa-
tion of entitlements might be that people employ
proportionality or some other normative rule to the
new budget set and recalculate their entitlements for
the lower budget. Both representations are consistent
with our view of entitlements because we see enti-
tlements as subjectively perceived rights. These rights
might focus on proportionality or any other norma-
tive rule, or on the historical claims.
Thus, there are many competing hypotheses about
people’s perceived entitlements. Our first main result
records the evidence.
Result 1. We find clear evidence for asymmet-
ric entitlements, with the proportional split accord-
ing to the infeasible claims being the empirically
3 The Talmud rule (see, e.g., Aumann and Maschler 1985) is based
on the idea that first the portions that are not under dispute are
allocated. That is, the winner does not claim more than 1,660 (out
of the 2,050), and the loser does not claim more than 830 (out of
2,050). Hence, the winner concedes 390 to the loser, whereas the
loser concedes 1,220 to the winner. The remaining amount 2050−
390− 1220 = 50 is split equally. Therefore, the final allocation to
the winner is 1220+25= 1245, which is 60.7% of the feasible pie.
4 For an extensive recent survey on a positive analysis of various
justice theories, see Konow (2003).
5 Evidence for such a self-serving bias has been produced in tightly
controlled laboratory experiments (Babcock and Loewenstein 1997,
Camerer and Loewenstein 1993), but also in field studies (Babcock
et al. 1996) and in survey studies (Dahl and Ransom 1999).
Table 2 Summary Statistics of Fairness Judgments
Arbitrator question
Definition “According to your opinion, what would be
a ‘fair’ distribution of salaries from the
vantage point of a noninvolved neutral
arbitrator?”
Variable Fair distribution (in “winner share”)








∗ Significance at the 10%-level
# t-test: p-value in parentheses, two-sided test
predominant fairness judgment. We find a surpris-
ingly small self-serving bias; i.e., fairness judgments
are only weakly role dependent.
Table 2 and Figure 1 show that the average judg-
ment of the fair settlement is strongly skewed away
from the equal split toward the proportional split.
The average perceived fair share was 62.8%. The fair-
ness judgments do not differ according to gender, age,
income, and field of study of the respondents (all
p-values are at least 0.20). As Figure 1 shows, only
a few people thought that the equal split is the fair
settlement in the eyes of an arbitrator; almost all peo-
ple believed that a fair division entitles the winner
to considerably more than half of the surplus. The
modal judgment is that the fair sharing is a split of
the reduced pie in proportion to the claims. A test of
proportions confirms that the fraction of people who
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believed that the proportional split is fair is signifi-
cantly higher than the share of people who considered
the equal split as being fair (p < 0001, two-sided).
Thus, there can be no doubt that our subjects derived
a strong entitlement from the infeasible claims.
Figure 1 and Table 2 also show some differences
in fairness judgments between winners and losers.
On average, the winners thought that the fair share
to the winner according to the arbitrator question is
64.0%, whereas the losers thought that, on average,
the fair share is 61.6%. This relatively small difference
in fairness judgments is only marginally significant
(p= 0078, two-sided t-test) and suggests a surpris-
ingly weak self-serving bias. The self-serving bias
seems to be much smaller than previously observed
(e.g., Babcock et al. 1995). It also indicates an impor-
tant role for losers’ obligations, the counterpart of
winners’ entitlements.
Interestingly, the winner’s entitlement is closest
to the proportional rule, whereas the loser’s entitle-
ment corresponds very closely to the Talmud solution,
which grants the loser 39.3% and the winner 60.7%.
3.2. The Role of Entitlements in the
Bargaining Process
Although it is remarkable that losers thought they
were entitled to less than 40%, one may object
that such fairness judgments are vacuous statements.
Moreover, the definitions of entitlements and obli-
gations demand that people have a motivational
disposition to defend or respect them. Put differ-
ently, entitlement effects in bargaining require that
we should find a correlation between the fairness
judgments and negotiation behavior. However, for
at least three reasons, finding such correlations is
not straightforward. First, it must be the case that
fairness judgments are not only cheap talk, but that
negotiators actually feel committed to their entitle-
ments and express this in their bargaining behavior. In
other words, the entitlements (as elicited by the fair-
ness judgments) should serve as an anchor (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974) for negotiation behavior. Sec-
ond, negotiators may have to compromise on their
entitlements if they want to avoid an impasse, which
may weaken a correlation even if people feel com-
mitted to their entitlements. Third, bargaining tactics,
like toughness or stubbornness, might undermine any
entitlement effect.
If fairness judgments matter, we expect that they
influence the negotiation process as follows: (i) The
opening offers of both winners and losers are posi-
tively correlated with their respective fairness judg-
ments, and (ii) the larger the difference in fairness
judgments between losers and winners is, the longer
it takes to reach an agreement, and the smaller are the
concessions made during the bargaining process.
Figure 2 and the statistical analyses reported in
Tables 4–6 in the appendix provide the support for
our second result:
Result 2. Fairness judgments are statistically sig-
nificantly correlated with (i) opening offers, (ii) bar-
gaining duration, and (iii) concession behavior.
We will now discuss the support for results (i) to
(iii) in turn.
Opening Offers. Figure 2(a) depicts—separately
for losers and winners—the opening share to the
winner (defined as the very first offer) of a subject
who has made an opening offer as a function of
this subject’s fairness judgment. As the scatter plot
demonstrates and the Spearman rank correlation ver-
ifies, there is a highly significantly positive correla-
tion between the fairness judgments of losers and the
loser’s opening shares to the winner.6 While losers
exhibit a considerable variation in their fairness judg-
ments and opening offers, the fairness judgments of
winners who made an opening offer cluster around
the proportional split (leading to an insignificant cor-
relation). Accordingly, winners tend to ask for the pro-
portional split or more.
Figure 2(a) also shows that the opening offers
depended on who was making them (the difference in
opening offers between losers and winners is highly
significant, one-sided Mann-Whitney test; p < 001).
The observation that fairness judgments have signifi-
cantly influenced the opening offers allows us to sepa-
rate the entitlement effect in the opening offers from a
strategic offer effect. On average, winners who made
an opening offer thought that a winner share of 66.7%
was fair and actually asked for 71.6%; losers who
made an opening offer judged a share of 61.1% as
fair and offered only 52.4%. Thus, the strategic offer
effect amounts to 4.9 percentage points for winners
and to 8.8 percentage points for losers. Both effects
are highly significant according to Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests that compare opening offers and fairness
judgments (p < 001). However, the magnitude of the
strategic offer effect is not role dependent (p = 0132,
one-sided Mann-Whitney test).
Bargaining Duration and Concession Behavior.
It is natural to look at bargaining duration as a func-
tion of the tension in fairness judgments. Figure 2(b)
plots the bargaining duration against the difference in
6 Due to distorting graphical scale effects, Figure 2(a) does not
contain the “outlier” 5024. In the calculation of the Spearman
rank correlation coefficient reported in the figure, the outlier is
included, however. The positive correlation also holds if we remove
it: 	= 047; p = 0011. These findings are also corroborated by a
Tobit regression analysis, which can be found in Table 4 in the
appendix.
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fairness judgments between a winner and a loser (i.e.,
DIFF_FAIR=W_FAIR−L_FAIR).7
The figure nicely shows that there is a significantly
positive correlation between the tension in fairness
judgments in a bargaining dyad and the bargain-
ing duration (in Figure 2(b) “×” denotes disagree-
ments; they are, however, excluded in the calculation
of correlations). We corroborate this observation with
several robustness checks in a Tobit regression analy-
sis, which can be found in the appendix.
7 Note that this measure becomes negative if the loser gives more
to the winner than the winner gives to herself according to the
arbitrator question. We interpret this as observing no tension in
the bargaining dyad. Notice further that a positive difference in
fairness judgments is equivalent to having inconsistent entitlements
(which sum up to more than 100%) whenever the loser grants the
winner at least 50% of the pie.
On average, it took negotiators 590 seconds to reach
an agreement. Bargaining pairs with a negative ten-
sion in their fairness judgments reached an agree-
ment in 435 seconds, whereas pairs with inconsistent
entitlements (i.e., DIFF_FAIR> 0) needed 737 seconds
to strike an agreement. The difference is more than
five minutes and is highly significant according to a
Mann-Whitney test (p < 0002, one-sided).
Our findings also shed new light on the often-
observed “deadline effect” in bargaining (Roth et al.
1988). As in many related previous bargaining exper-
iments, most agreements in our experiment were
reached in the very last minute; up-to-the-last-minute
agreement times are roughly uniformly distributed.
Inconsistent fairness judgments were a major deter-
minant of the deadline effect in our experiments.
On average, DIFF_FAIR of all pairs who reached an
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agreement in the very last minute was 5.2 percent-
age points; the average DIFF_FAIR of agreements
prior to the last minute was only 0.3 percentage
points. This difference is significant according to a
Mann-Whitney test (p = 0015, one-sided). Although
there may exist strategic reasons to delay the negotia-
tions (e.g., Fershtman and Seidmann 1993), our results
show that delay is significantly affected by differences
in fairness judgments. Thus, tension in entitlements is
an independent cause of delay. This also holds if we
control for the difference in opening offers (see the
regression model in the appendix).
As we have seen, opening offers of losers and win-
ners are, on average, rather far apart from each other.
Thus, concessions are necessary to reach an agreement.
To be able to relate concessions to fairness judgments,
we need to develop a statistic that captures concession
behavior. To our knowledge, no concession indices yet
exist that take the peculiarities of concessions in free-
form bargaining into account. We therefore developed
indices that measure concession behavior.
In general, a concession can be seen as an offer
that makes the opponent better off. However, the
same absolute concession can be perceived as small
when the standing offers are far apart, or generous
when the standing offers are close to each other. Fur-
thermore, concession behavior can also be weighted
along the time dimension. Someone who is willing
to give in early in the negotiation might be seen as
more compromising and less tough than someone
who concedes the same amount only if an impasse is
imminent.
The “magnitude” of a concession depends on the
“current bargaining area,” which we define as the
difference in standing offers of the two negotiators.
Because it is in the nature of concessions that they
reduce the bargaining area, it is obvious that the same
absolute concession can actually be large or small.
Therefore, we normalize concessions by the current
bargaining area. This gives us the relative concession
as one measure of concession behavior. In the follow-
ing, we will investigate three individual statistics of
the concession behavior of a negotiator: (i) the aver-
age relative concession; (ii) the average concession time,
i.e., the average point in time a negotiator made a
concession; and (iii) the average time-weighted relative
concession, i.e., a combination of the average relative
concession and the average concession time.8
We expect that the difference in fairness judgments
will influence individual concessions. However, pre-
8 The exact definitions are as follows. A relative concession of a win-
ner is defined as the difference between a winner’s standing offer
(in winner share) and his new offer (in winner share) divided by
the current bargaining area. The current bargaining area is given
by the difference between the standing offer of the winner (as win-
ner share) and the standing offer of the loser (as winner share).
A relative concession of a loser is defined analogously. For example, if
vious research suggests that concession behavior is
to some extent reciprocal; i.e., concessions made by
one negotiator also depend on concessions made by
the opponent (see, e.g., Kuon and Uhlich 1993, and
Hennig-Schmidt 1999). Indeed, we find that conces-
sions and concession times are significantly correlated
between negotiators. To cope with this problem, we
restrict our analysis to pairs of bargainers by taking
for each pair the sum of the particular individual con-
cession statistics as the relevant unit of observation.
We conjecture that the larger the difference in
fairness judgments, the smaller concessions will be
and/or the later they will occur. We expect, therefore,
in statistical terms at the pair level that (i) the sum
of average relative concessions is negatively correlated
with DIFF_FAIR, (ii) the sum of average concession times
is positively correlated with DIFF_FAIR, and (iii) the
sum of average time-weighted relative concessions is neg-
atively correlated with DIFF_FAIR.
The Spearman rank-order correlations (one-sided
tests) support these hypotheses: They are (i) −028
(p < 005), (ii) 0.49 (p < 0001), and (iii) −048 (p <
0001), respectively. Figure 2(c) illustrates the con-
nection between DIFF_FAIR and concession behavior
for our most encompassing concession statistics, the
sum of average time-weighted relative concessions, which
for brevity we call “concession index” in the figure.
According to this measure, a given relative conces-
sion is weighted less the later the concession is made.
Thus, a larger value of this concession index corre-
sponds to a higher willingness to concede. The figure
nicely shows that pairs with a low concession index
also strongly disagree on what a fair division of the
surplus is (lower-right part of the figure). Conversely,
pairs who do not differ in their fairness judgments are
the standing offers of a winner and a loser are 0.7 and 0.5, respec-
tively (i.e., the current bargaining area is 0.2), and the winner now
demands only 0.6 for himself, then the absolute concession is 0.1
and the relative concession is 0.5 (=01/02). The magnitude of 0.5
can be interpreted as going halfway toward an agreement. The ini-
tial bargaining area is assumed to be the difference in claims (i.e.,
(1660− 830/2050≈ 04). A concession leading to a new offer that
precisely matches the opponent’s standing offer gives a relative
concession of 1. Therefore, an acceptance is calculated as a relative
concession of 1. The summary statistics average relative concession
of a bargainer is just the average of all of his relative concessions
made during the bargaining process.
The average concession time of a bargainer is defined as the sum
of concession times divided by the number of concessions.
A time-weighted relative concession is a relative concession (as
defined above) multiplied by (901− time of concession) if the conces-
sion is positive and multiplied by time of concession if the concession
is negative, respectively. This measure has the property that a given
positive (negative) relative concession gets the less (more) weight
the later the concession is made. The statistic we use is the average
of all time-weighted relative concessions of a negotiator.
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those that also make relatively large and early conces-
sions (upper-left part).9 All of our results are corrob-
orated by regression analyses (see the appendix).
Thus, the greater the tension with respect to fair-
ness judgments in a bargaining pair, the later conces-
sions are made and the smaller the concessions are.
These findings also provide an explanation for why
we observe a significant relationship between fairness
judgments and bargaining duration.
3.3. Entitlements and Agreements
The ultimate interest in a negotiation is to reach an
agreement. In previous symmetric free-form bargain-
ing experiments with zero conflict payoffs, an exact
equal split of the surplus has been observed almost
unanimously (see, e.g., Nydegger and Owen 1975).
If the infeasible claims influence the entitlements and
thereby the terms of agreement, then the distribution
of agreements should be skewed away from the equal
split.
In this case, there should also be a correlation of
reached agreements with the fairness judgments. We
expect that, in a pair, the agreed share to the winner is
positively correlated with the fairness judgment of a
winner and the fairness judgment of a loser. The ratio-
nale for this hypothesis is that the more any of the
bargainers in a pair would give to the winner accord-
ing to the arbitrator question, the “easier” it should
be to agree on a higher winner share.
Our third result establishes the influence of the fair-
ness judgments in shaping the agreements.
Result 3. (i) We find a strong entitlement effect in
the agreements: On average, the agreed share to the
winner is 60.5%. (ii) The fairness judgments of win-
ners and losers are highly significantly positively cor-
related with the agreements. (iii) Our results suggest
that disagreements are indirectly related to the fair-
ness judgments.
Figure 3 provides graphical support for our results
3(i) and 3(ii). Figure 3(a) shows the distribution of
agreements in the experiment. It provides strong
evidence for an entitlement effect in the reached
agreements. The distribution of agreements is highly
significantly skewed away from the equal split (p <
00001, t-test, one-sided). Only 11% of the agreements
implemented the equal split. The most common
agreements occurred at 67%, i.e., the proportional
split according to the claims.10 We even observe
agreements above the proportional split. The mean
9 The correlation result is robust with respect to the “outlier” in the
upper-left part of the figure. Without this data point, Spearman’s
rho becomes −044 with a one-sided p-value of 0.0015.
10 The reader might ask how robust this result is to different claims.
For the sake of not overburdening the analysis of entitlements in
bargaining, we have in this paper refrained from manipulating
claims levels. However, in Gächter and Riedl (2004) we investigate
agreed share to the winner was 60.5%, which comes
very close to the Talmud solution that grants the win-
ner 60.7%. In our view, this provides strong evidence
for an entitlement effect in the agreements.
Figure 3(b) depicts the correlation of reached agree-
ments and the fairness judgments. The results are con-
sistent with all of our previous observations. We find
a strongly positive correlation between fairness judg-
ments of winners and losers and the agreed share to
the winner. The Spearman rank correlation between
the fairness judgment of a winner and the reached
agreement is positive and highly significant (	= 055,
p < 0001, one-sided test); for the loser, it is as well sig-
nificantly positive (	= 031, p= 0033, one-sided test).
The robust Tobit estimates that are reported in Table 7
of the appendix strengthen these findings. Thus, fair-
ness judgments not only significantly shape the bar-
gaining process, but agreements as well.
Additional evidence for the importance of entitle-
ments comes from the messages that could be sent
along with proposals. From the total of 406 propos-
als, 287 were accompanied by some message. Most of
them contained text like “I want more” or “Your offer
was too small.” However, 70 messages contained text
with arguments explicitly referring to fairness consid-
erations and/or entitlements and obligations. Forty-
two of these messages were sent by winners and
28 by losers. In 33 cases, winners argued for unequal
divisions near the proportional split because of bet-
ter performance and performance-based fairness con-
siderations. Interestingly, in almost 50% of the cases,
losers also argued along these lines (although their
proposed winner share was mostly smaller than the
winner share demanded by the winner). The other
half of the classified loser messages contained argu-
ments in favor of the equal split. In contrast, only
4 of the 33 messages of winners contained such argu-
ments. In our view, this supports the conclusion that
winners’ bargaining behavior was strongly influenced
by entitlements derived from the infeasible claims.
Furthermore, it seems that a nonnegligible part of
losers actually felt obliged to concede the winners sig-
nificantly more than half of the pie.
An important issue in the study of negotiations is
the explanation of disagreements. In our experiment
we observed a total of seven disagreements (16% of
all bargaining encounters). Although the percentage
of disagreements is completely in line with previous
findings (see Roth et al. 1988), in absolute terms there
are still just a few cases in number. We can therefore
sketch only possible determinants of disagreements.
the impact of different claims levels on normative judgments and
actual negotiations in a slightly different context. We find that, by
and large, the proportional rule explains the data well.
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In accord with our previous analyses, we expect
that bargaining pairs that disagreed are characterized
by larger differences in fairness judgments than the
pairs that reached an agreement. Indeed, the differ-
ence in fairness judgments is lower for pairs that
found a settlement than for those that did not (2 and
4.8 percentage points, respectively). However, because
this difference is statistically not significant (p= 0380,
one-sided Mann-Whitney test), we cannot claim to
detect a direct influence of the differences in fairness
judgments on the disagreements (see also Figure 2(b)).
A further analysis, however, shows that the differ-
ence in first offers is significantly lower for agreements
than for disagreements. The difference in first offers of
winner shares of pairs who reached an agreement is
13.7 percentage points, whereas for pairs that did not
reach an agreement it is 27.6 percentage points. This
difference is highly significant according to a Mann-
Whitney test (p = 0003, one-sided). Furthermore, the
average concession time is significantly lower for
agreements than for disagreements. The average rel-
ative concession and the average time-weighted rel-
ative concession are significantly larger for agree-
ments than for disagreements (all p-values < 0001,
one-sided Mann-Whitney test). Together with our pre-
vious findings that both opening offers and concession
behavior are significantly influenced by the fairness
judgments, this establishes an indirect relation of the
fairness judgments with the settlement rates.
Another interesting question is whether the entitle-
ments actually paid off, given that they might have
led to bargaining impasse and zero payoffs. A calcu-
lation of Spearman rank-order correlations between
final payoffs (including the zero disagreement pay-
offs) and the fairness judgments reveals a significantly
positive correlation of the winners’ final payoff
with their fairness judgments (	 = 033; p= 0014,
one-sided). For losers, the correlation between the
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final payoff and fairness judgments (in “winner
share”) is weakly significantly negative (	 = −0204;
p= 0092, one-sided). Thus, in our experiment entitle-
ments did pay off—at least for winners.
4. The Role of the Self-Serving Bias
in the Entitlements
Entitlements and obligations by negotiators are
grounded in what they perceive as being a “fair”
agreement. In our experiment, the fairness judgments
of losers were lower than those of the winners, which
suggests the existence of a self-serving bias among
our bargainers (see Table 2). However, the differ-
ence is surprisingly small in magnitude and only
weakly significant. We find this to be a surprising
result, given (i) the findings of previous research,
and (ii) the existence of possible multiple focal points
of our bargaining problem (see also Camerer and
Loewenstein 1993, Babcock and Loewenstein 1997).
It seems that the perceived entitlements and obliga-
tions in our bargaining-with-claims experiment were
strong enough to weaken any self-serving bias con-
siderably. This holds especially for the losers who
largely did not think that the equal split is fair. A
speculative explanation for this might be that we pro-
vided the subjects with an explicit statement of the
relevant precedent, i.e., the historical claims. Because
self-servingly biased fairness considerations increase
the likelihood of bargaining impasse (Babcock et al.
1995), precedents that presumably reinforce a com-
mon understanding of entitlements might be a means
to reduce disagreements in negotiations.
The knowledge of one’s role when making the
fairness judgment may nevertheless have influenced
judgments, and hence, negotiation behavior. This
raises the question of to what extent the timing of our
“arbitrator question” affects stated fairness judgments
and bargaining behavior. To test that, we ran a con-
trol experiment—with another 44 subjects (22 pairs)—
where fairness judgments were made behind the “veil
of ignorance.” This experiment was an exact copy
of the experiment of our main condition, with one
important exception. In the control experiment sub-
jects had to answer the arbitrator question before they
knew whether they would be the winner or the loser
of the performance quiz. Actually, the arbitrator ques-
tion was asked right after reading the instructions and
before performing the knowledge quiz (this procedure
is adapted from Babcock et al. 1995). Note that in this
setting, fairness judgments, by definition, cannot be
self-servingly biased.
We summarize the findings of this control experi-
ment in the following result.
Result 4. If subjects assess fairness before they
know their role in the negotiations, the fairness judg-
ments of ex post winners and losers do not differ.
Furthermore, in stark contrast to our main condi-
tion, the fairness judgments made behind the “veil of
ignorance” cannot explain the variation in bargaining
behavior in any phase of the negotiations. The aver-
age bargaining behavior is similar to that in our main
condition.
Table 3 provides the support for the results of the
control condition. It documents the Spearman rank-
order correlations for each of our bargaining statis-
tics with the relevant fairness judgment measures (see
also the note at the bottom of the table). For the sake
of comparisons, this table also summarizes the means
(and standard deviations) of the main condition, as
well as the control condition. In the last column we
report the p-values of statistical comparisons of the
main condition with the control condition.
The most important findings are as follows. First,
fairness judgments are very similarly distributed in
the control experiment as they are in the main exper-
iment (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0728). Second,
as expected, fairness judgments of ex post winners
and losers are virtually the same (p = 0804, two-
sided Mann-Whitney test) and lie between the fair-
ness judgments of winners and losers in our main
condition. Third, in stark contrast to our main con-
dition, fairness judgments made behind the “veil of
ignorance” do not explain the variation in bargaining
behavior (see column “Correlation” in Table 3). Not
a single correlation of a particular bargaining statistic
with the respective fairness judgment is significant at
the conventional levels. Because fairness judgments
are identically distributed in our control experiment
and in our main experiment, this lack of correlation
is unlikely to be due to a lack of variation of fairness
judgments. Fourth, there are no treatment differences
between the levels of our variables of bargaining
behavior in our main condition and the control condi-
tion. The only possible exception is bargaining dura-
tion, which was weakly significantly longer in the
control condition than in the main condition.
The agreements are of particular interest. As in
our main condition, we also find a strong entitlement
effect in our control condition. The mean agreed share
to the winner is 62.3% and not significantly differ-
ent from the 60.5% observed in our main condition
(p = 0495, two-sided Mann-Whitney test). Although
there is no correlation between the variation in fair-
ness judgments and the variance of the reached agree-
ments, notice that the levels of agreement and fairness
judgments correspond closely.
The observations summarized in Results 2 to 4 that:
(i) with role knowledge, fairness judgments and nego-
tiation behavior are highly significantly correlated;
(ii) without role knowledge, the fairness judgments
cannot explain the variation in bargaining behavior;
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Table 3 Summary Statistics and Correlations with Fairness Judgment (Main Condition and Control Condition)
Main condition Control condition
Comparison of
Mean Mean main and control
(Std. dev.) N (Std. dev.) N Correlation condition p-values
Fairness judgments (in percent)
Winner 64.0 45 61.8 22 0287d
(6.2) (7.1)
Loser 61.6 45 62.3 22 0634d
(6.8) (6.6)
Opening offers (in percent)
Winner 71.6 20 70.8 12 −021a 0327d
(5.4) (10.5)
Loser 52.4 25 54.3 10 000b 0970d
(12.8) (4.4)
Bargaining duration (in seconds) 590 37 718 17 030c 0061d
(278) (228)
Sum of average
Relative concessions 0.614 44 0.537 22 −014c 0496d
(0.452) (0.388)
Concession times 767 44 872 22 007c 0237d
(336) (251)
Time-weighted relative 0.389 44 0.286 22 −010c 0334d
concessions (0.377) (0.336)
Agreements (in percent) 60.5 37 62.3 17 −029a 0495d
(6.7) (4.2) 17 032b
Disagreement rate (in percent) 15.9 44 22.7 22 0515e
Final payoffs (in percent)
Winner 50.9 44 48.1 22 −000a 0962d
(23.2) (27.0)
Loser 33.2 44 29.1 22 005b 0342d
(15.8) (16.6)
Notes. Correlation statistics are Spearman’s rho. a Correlation with winner fairness judgment (W_FAIR). b Correlation with
loser fairness judgment (L_FAIR). c Correlation with difference in fairness judgments. (DIFF_FAIR =W_FAIR− L_FAIR).
All correlations are insignificant; one-sided tests. d Two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. e Two-sided Fisher’s exact test.
and (iii) the average negotiation behavior in our con-
trol experiment is not statistically significantly dif-
ferent from the main experiment, seem to be puz-
zling at first sight. However, research on the “hot-cold
empathy gap,” which is a pervasive phenomenon in
decision making (see, e.g., Loewenstein 2000) suggests
an explanation. Being in the “hot state” of knowing
one’s economic position when making a fairness judg-
ment may lead to a (subconscious) commitment to
the stated fairness assessments, which may be rein-
forced by a self-serving bias. These feelings of commit-
ment to (biased) fairness judgments are likely to shape
behavior. This explains why bargaining behavior is
strongly correlated with stated fairness judgments in
our main condition (Results 2 and 3). In our control
condition, negotiators made their fairness judgments
in the “cold state” of not yet knowing their role. The
“cold” fairness judgments may have led to an insuf-
ficiently strong commitment to influence bargaining
behavior. Once bargainers learned their claims and
moved into the “hot state” of knowing their economic
position, they may have reassessed their fairness judg-
ments and gotten anchored on them in a way similar
to that of the subjects of our main condition.
5. Concluding Remarks
There can be no doubt that subjects in our exper-
iments derived a “moral property right” from the
claims they have earned.11 By letting subjects nego-
tiate in a situation where they were confronted with
infeasible claims, we created a testbed for studying
entitlements and obligations, which are not abstract
legal rights or liabilities. The claims were economi-
cally irrelevant, and yet they instilled in our subjects
11 In this sense, our study extends earlier research on entitlements.
For instance, Güth and Tietz (1985), Hoffman and Spitzer (1985),
and Hoffman et al. (1994) investigated how role assignment (earned
or randomly assigned) influenced allocation decisions in ultima-
tum and dictator games. Babcock et al. (1995) examined the role of
self-servingly biased entitlements in bargaining. For a discussion
of experiments on entitlements, see Camerer (2003). None of these
studies investigated entitlements derived from infeasible claims.
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a subjectively perceived right or obligation. This is
reflected in the fairness judgments. Moreover, as the
negotiation behavior shows, subjects with the high
claim were willing to defend their moral property
rights, and subjects with the low claim largely felt
obliged to accept them. Our results indicate that the
entitlements expressed by negotiators are not only
used for strategic purposes, but bear a close relation-
ship to what negotiators believe and actually do. Fair-
ness is not just a smoke screen to advance self-interest.
Our findings suggest an interesting relation be-
tween “legal” and “moral” property rights. Legal
property rights are crucial for the usual Coasean rea-
sons.12 Because the legal property rights were the
same for the bargaining partners, our results show
that entitlements constitute a moral property right
that also exists irrespective of the legal rights. Thus,
in negotiations, bargainers will also put their moral
property rights on the bargaining table, and this will
strongly influence the bargaining process and out-
come.
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Appendix
Here we provide robustness tests with the help of robust
Tobit regressions for our results presented in §§3.2 to 3.3.
We proceed in the same sequence as in the main text by first
reporting the results concerning the bargaining process, i.e.,
opening offers, bargaining duration and concessions, fol-
lowed by the results concerning the agreements. The regres-
sion results confirm the results stated in the main text.
12 For experimental evidence on this, see, e.g., Harrison and McKee
(1985), Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), Croson and Johnston (2000).
Table 4 Explaining the Opening Offers (Robust Tobit Estimates)
Dependent variable: Opening share to winner
Loser& Winner
Independent Coefficient Coefficient
variables (Std. err.) z-value (Std. err.) z-value










Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗Significance at the 1%
level. ∗∗ At the 5% level. ∗ At the 10% level; one-sided tests. ‡ Significance at
the 5% level; two-sided tests. & The outlier 050024 has been removed.
Opening Offers. The results reported in Table 4 con-
firm those provided in the main text (see Result 2(i)).13 Like
the Spearman rank-order correlations, the regression results
show that the opening offers made by losers are highly
correlated with their fairness judgments. For winners, the
variation in fairness judgments cannot explain the variation
in opening offers. Note, however, that the constant is, with
0.648, close to the proportional split and almost the same as
the average fairness judgments made by winners. This is a
consequence of the fact that the winners’ fairness judgments
show relatively little variation and are clustered around the
proportional split.
Bargaining Duration. The result of Regression Model 1
in Table 5 resembles the Spearman rank-order statistics
in the main text. The regression outcome confirms that
a higher difference (i.e., tension) in fairness judgments
between the winner and the loser in a bargaining pair sig-
nificantly increases the time till an agreement is reached
(p < 001, one-sided). Model 2 shows that this result is
robust when taking the difference in first offers (i.e., the
difference in the opening offer and the first counteroffer)
into account. Both the difference in first offers and the dif-
ference in fairness judgments significantly increase the bar-
gaining duration (p < 001 in both cases, one-sided tests).
In Model 3, we investigate how the fairness judgment of the
loser and the winner separately influence bargaining dura-
tion (again accounting for the difference in first offers). The
hypotheses are that the more the loser would give to the
winner according to the arbitrator question, the faster an
agreement is reached. The more the winner would give to
the winner according to the arbitrator question, the longer it
will take to reach an agreement. As the results for Model 3
show, both hypotheses are confirmed (p= 010 and p < 001
for L_FAIR and W_FAIR, respectively). Interestingly, the
fairness judgment of the winner has a much stronger impact
on bargaining duration than that of the loser.
13 In the table, L_FAIR represents the losers’ fairness judgment and
W_FAIR the winners’ fairness judgment (both in winner shares).
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Table 5 Explaining Bargaining Duration (Robust Tobit Estimates)
Dependent variable: Agreement time
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
variables (Std.err.) z-value (Std.err.) z-value (Std.err.) z-value
Constant 5599∗∗∗ 1293 4368∗∗∗ 8.43 −2823 −074
433 518 3810






DIFF_FIRST 9353∗∗∗ 3.29 10241∗∗∗ 454
2840 2254
Log-L −2558 −2492 −2480
Wald 
2 15.82‡ 34.77‡ 46.52‡
N 37 37 37
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significance at the 1% level. ∗∗ At the 5% level. ∗ At the
10% level; one-sided tests. ‡ Significance at the 1% level; two-sided tests.
Table 6 Explaining Concessions (Robust Tobit Estimates)
Dependent variables
Sum of average concession times
Sum of average
Sum of average time-weighted
relative concessions relative concessions
Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3
Independent Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
variables (Std.err.) z-value (Std.err.) z-value (Std.err.) z-value (Std.err.) z-value
Constant 0656∗∗∗ 922 7229∗∗∗ 1553 5618∗∗∗ 9.46 0440∗∗∗ 787
0071 466 594 0056
DIFF_FAIR −1677∗∗∗ −256 17795∗∗∗ 438 15807∗∗∗ 4.66 −2034∗∗∗ −402
0656 4065 3391 0506
DIFF_FIRST 10421∗∗∗ 4.28
2437
Log-L −242 −3119 −3046 −128
Wald 
2 6.54† 19.16‡ 43.42‡ 16.19‡
N 44 44 44 44
Notes. For the exact definition of the dependent variables, see Footnote 8. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significance at the 1% level.
∗∗ At the 5% level. ∗ At the 10% level; one-sided tests. ‡ Significance at the 1% level, † at the 5% level; two-sided tests.
Concession Behavior. Table 6 corroborates the findings
reported in the main text. For all our concession statistics—
sum of average relative concessions (Model 1), sum of average
concession times (Models 2(a) and 2(b)), and sum of average
time-weighted relative concessions (Model 3)—the difference in
fairness judgments (DIFF_FAIR) in a dyad has the “right”
sign and is highly significant (p < 001 in all cases, one-
sided tests). Hence, our regression results confirm that the
higher the tension in a bargaining pair, the smaller conces-
sions are and the later concessions are made. In principle,
it is possible that concession behavior is also influenced by
the first offers. The greater the difference is, the more con-
cessions have to be made and/or the larger the concessions
have to be to reach an agreement. Our definition of relative
concessions accounts for that (see Footnote 8). However, it
may be the case that the timing of concessions is influenced
by the first offers. Therefore, in Model 2(b) we control for
the difference in first offers. The result shows that (i) the
difference in fairness judgments stays highly significant and
(ii) that the difference in first offers indeed has a significant
(positive) impact on the concession time (p < 001 in both
cases, one-sided tests).
Agreements. In the main text, we found with the help of
Spearman rank-order statistics that the fairness judgments
of losers and winners are significantly positively correlated
with the agreement (in winner share) reached in a bargain-
ing pair. The regression results shown in Table 7 corroborate
this finding. The fairness judgment of losers as well as the
fairness judgment of winners exhibit a highly significantly
positive coefficient (p < 001 for both variables, one-sided
tests).
Gächter and Riedl: Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims
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Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significance at the 1%
level, one-sided tests. ‡ Significance at the 1% level; two-sided tests.
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